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Abstract: This paper attempts to identify the different channels through which economic reforms 
can affect the incidence of child labour in a developing economy. Using a three-sector general 
equilibrium model it shows that inflows of foreign capital can lower the problem of child labour 
by raising the return to education and reducing the earning opportunities of children. It 
demonstrates how foreign capital produces favourable effect on the incidence of child labour 
although it affects wage inequality adversely. 
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FOREIGN CAPITAL, RETURN TO EDUCATION AND CHILD LABOUR  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The developing countries have chosen free trade as their development strategy and been 
vigorously implementing economic reforms for the last two decades or so. However, the new 
development approach has not so far been an unmixed blessing. In their endeavour in 
implementing liberalized policies these economies have been facing some adjustment costs of 
which increasing skilled-unskilled wage inequality and persistence of poverty and incidence of 
child labour are worth mentioning. Advocates of economic liberalization with standard trade 
theoretical models in mind expected the wage inequality to improve in the developing economies 
and the incidence of child labour to fall through reductions in poverty. However, empirical 
studies reveal that the wage inequality and poverty have increased in many liberalizing 
economies1 and the incidence of child labour has not decreased satisfactorily.  
 
While there is a scanty theoretical literature2 explaining the deteriorating wage inequality in the 
developing economies, such a literature on child labour is yet to emerge. The first and foremost 
task of this theoretical literature would be to identify the different channels through which 
economic reforms can affect the child labour problem. Empirical research e.g. Cigno et al. (2002) 
and Neumayer and Soysa (2005) has reported that trade and investment reforms have produced a 
favorable impact on child labour through the positive income effect. However, there are reasons 
to believe that the incomes of the poorer section of the working population have not at least 
increased in the developing economies during the liberalized regime.3 Hence, whatever little 
impact on child labour the liberalized policies have so far made must have come through channels 
other than the income effect. The need for identifying these alternative routes has also been 
recognized by Neumayer and Soysa (2005). In the circumstances, the present paper using a three-
sector general equilibrium model shows that inflows of foreign capital can indeed lower the 
problem of child labour by raising the return to education. It demonstrates how foreign capital 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Robbins (1996), Wood (1997). 
 
2 One may go through Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (in press) for a complete list of works. 
 
3 See Khan (1998) and Tendulkar et al. (1996) among others. 
 3 
produces favorable effect on the incidence of child labour even though it affects wage inequality 
adversely.  
 
2. Household behaviour 
 
We consider a two period optimising problem of the representative working family consisting of 
one adult member (the guardian) and a child. The guardian in the first period works in the adult 
labour market and earns wage W0. In this period, he takes decision about his child’s work effort 
and schooling. Total child time is 1, a part of which ( )Cl is sent out to work at the wage rate CW . 
Time not spent on working is spent in school4. Hence (1 )Cl− is the child’s schooling. So, 
the Cl part of the child labour time earns the child wage ,( ),CW in the first period and the unskilled 
adult wage ( )W in the second period while the (1 )Cl− fraction earns nothing in the first period but 
the skilled wage ( )SW in the second period.
5 In the presence of positive return on education, SW is 
greater than W . In the second period, the guardian earns nothing and lives on the income he 
receives from his child who has become an adult worker by this time.  
 
We assume that parent cares only about the lifetime family consumption and does not attach 
value to the child’s leisure. The utility is therefore a function of consumption levels in the two 
periods ( 0 and 1) and is represented as follows.  
ρβρ
ρρ
−+−=
−−
10 CCU         ∞<<− ρ1        (1) 
 β is the time discount factor and )
1
1( ρ+ is the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
The first period’s consumption (C0) consists of wage income of the guardian and child wage from 
the working time of the child. i.e., 
)( 00 CCWlWC +=          (2)                                          
The second period’s consumption ( 1C ) can be thought of as the sum of skilled wage of educated 
                                                 
4 This is a simplifying assumption that ignores the existence of non-labour non-school goers. 
 
5 Introduction of uncertainty in securing a skilled job in the second period would be an interesting 
theoretical exercise. However, the major results of the model still hold if the probability in 
finding a high-skill job is given exogenously.  
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adult (schooled in the first period) labour and unskilled wage of uneducated adult labour (worked 
in the first period).  
 1 ( (1 ) )C C SC l W l W= + −                                                              (3) 
We assume that the only cost of education is the opportunity cost in terms of forgone earnings of 
children.6 
 
The guardian maximises the lifetime utility (Equation (1)) with respect to Cl and subject to (2) 
and (3). The maximization exercise leads to the following child labour function by each working 
family.  
1/(1 )
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( ) ( )
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 −−   =
 − + −  
 
For algebraic simplicity we consider the special case when 0=ρ  which means a logarithmic 
utility function giving unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution7. The household child labour 
supply function then reduces to: 
0.
(1 )( ) (1 )
S
C
S C
W Wl
W W W
β
β β= −+ − +                              (4) 
 
An increase in current income 0, ,W (income from non-child source) raises 1C and hence 
lowers Cl following a positive income effect. An increase in the child wage rate implies an 
increase in the opportunity cost of education and hence leads to more child labour supply (i.e. less 
schooling). Any changes in skilled and/or unskilled wage impinge on the return to education and 
therefore influences the guardian’s decision regarding allocation of child time between his 
education and work. For example, an increase in skilled wage ( )SW  or a decrease in unskilled 
wage ( )W makes education more attractive and raises schooling time of the child thereby lowering 
the supply of child labour by the household.  
 
 
                                                 
6 One can incorporate direct schooling costs without affecting the qualitative results of the model. 
 
7 See Ranjan (1999) for a similar treatment. 
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3. The General Equilibrium Analysis 
 
We consider a small open economy with three sectors. Sector 1 produces an agricultural 
commodity, 1X , using adult unskilled labour ( )L , child labour ( )CL and capital ( )K . Sector 2 uses 
unskilled labour and capital to produces a low-skill commodity, 2X . Finally, sector 3 produces a 
high-skill commodity 3, ,X with the help of skilled labour ( )S  and capital. All are final 
commodities and their prices , s,iP  are given internationally. Competitive markets, CRS 
technologies with diminishing marginal productivities and full-employment of all resources are 
assumed. Capital endowment of the economy consists of both domestic capital ( )DK and foreign 
capital ( )FK and these are perfect substitutes. 
 
The usual price-unit cost equality conditions relating to the three sectors are as follows. 
1 1 1 1L C C KWa W a Ra P+ + =         (5)                                          
2 2 2L KWa Ra P+ =           (6)  
3 3 3S S KW a Ra P+ =                                                                                                               (7) 
where sjia are input-output ratios; and, R is the return to capital. 
 
Complete utilization of adult unskilled labour, child labour, capital and skilled labour imply the 
following four equations, respectively. 
LXaXa LL =+ 2211                                                                                                             (8) 
1 1C Ca X L=                                                                                                             (9) 
1 1 2 2 3 3K K K D Fa X a X a X K K K+ + = + =                                                                            (10)    
SXaS =33                                                                                                                            (11) 
 
Both unskilled and skilled working families are potential suppliers of child labour and their 
current wage incomes 0( )W are  and ,SW W respectively. Using equation (4) the aggregate child 
labour supply in the economy is obtained as follows.  
.1 .( )[ ]
1 ( ) ( )
S S S
C
S C S C
W W WWL L S
W W W W W W
ββ
β
   = − + −   + − −   
        (12) 
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4. General Equilibrium and Comparative Statics 
 
The general equilibrium structure consists of eight equations ((5) – (12)) and the same number of 
variables namely; 1 2 3, , , , , ,  and .C S CW W W R X X X L  This is an indecomposable system. So factor 
prices depend on both commodity prices and factor endowments. Totally differentiating equations 
(5) – (12) and solving by Cramer’s rule the following proposition can be established.8  
Proposition 1: An inflow of foreign capital worsens the skilled-unskilled wage inequality if the 
high-skill sector is capital-intensive (in a special sense) relative to the low-skill sector. The 
incidence of child labour, however, falls under the same sufficient condition.  
 
Inflows of foreign capital lower the return to capital , ,R as the supply rises given the demand. 
Both sectors 2 and 3 expand as they use capital but use two different types of labour. Sectors 1 
and 2 have a miniature HOS system as they use both capital and unskilled labour. Sector 1 
contracts following a Rybczynski effect as it is less capital-intensive vis-à-vis sector 2. The 
demand for child labour (skilled labour) falls (rises) in sector 1 (sector 3) as it is a specific factor. 
Consequently, the child wage (skilled wage) rate falls (rises). Saving on capital input raises the 
unskilled wage , ,W in sector 2 (equation (6)). What happens to the skilled-unskilled wage 
inequality depends on the rates of increase in SW andW . If sector 3 is capital-intensive in a 
special sense9 the saving on capital input in sector 3 is more than that in sector 2, which in turn, 
implies an increase in the relative wage inequality. A fall in CW means a decrease in the 
opportunity cost of education. On the other hand, the return to education rises as the wage 
inequality rises. Finally, the initial incomes from non-child source of both the unskilled and 
skilled working families increase which lower the supply of child labour by each family via the 
positive income effect. Hence, under the sufficient condition that the high-skill sector is capital-
intensive all these three effects work in the same direction and lower the incidence of child labour 
in the society. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 All qualitative results of the paper hold under a different sufficient condition even if sector 2 
uses child labour. 
 
9 See Jones and Neary (1984).  
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5.  Concluding remarks 
 
This note has explained how foreign capital inflows might produce favourable effect on the 
incidence of child labour in a developing economy despite affecting wage inequality adversely. 
The family supply function of child labour has been derived from the intertemporal utility 
maximizing behaviour of the working households which send some of their children for 
consumption smoothing owing to non-existence of a market for loans against future earnings. 
Then the aggregate child labour function is derived and a three-sector general equilibrium model 
has been developed for the purpose of analysis. The interesting result is that inflows of foreign 
capital might exert a downward pressure on the child labour incidence by raising the return to 
education (relative wage inequality). Hence, the problem of child labour may improve even if 
poverty itself does not fall. All these results are consistent with empirical findings. However, the 
assumption of non-existence of any market for loans against future earnings is restrictive but 
simplifying. In defence, we may note that inflows of foreign capital in the presence of an informal 
credit market should improve the borrowing terms of the households and lower the cost of 
education and hence the incidence of child labour.  
 
Appendix: 
 
Totally differentiating equations (5) – (11) and arranging in a matrix notation one gets:  
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where:  
1 2
1 2( ) 0;LL L LL L LLS S Sλ λ= + < 1 21 2( ) 0;KL K KL K KLS S Sλ λ= + >
1 2 3
1 2 3( ) 0;KK K KK K KK K KKS S S Sλ λ λ= + + < 1 21 2( ) 0;LK L LK L LKS S Sλ λ= + >  
3 3
1 3( ) 0;K SK KSA S Sλ= + > 32 3( ) 0;KK K SKA S Sλ= − < 3 1 2( ( ) );A B L S B LW= − + +             (A.2) 
4 2 ( ) 0;SA B LW SW= + > 5 1 2( ( ) ) 0;SA B L S B SW= + + >  
1 2
. 0;
(1 ) ( )
S
C S
W WB
L W Wβ= >+ − 2 0.(1 ) C CB L W
β
β= >+  
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k
jiS = the degree of substitution between factors j and i in the k th sector, , , , ,Cj i L S L K= ; and, 
k = 1,2,3. 0>kjiS for ij ≠ ; and, ;0<kjjS =jiθ distributive share of the j th input in the i th 
sector; =jiλ proportion of the j th input employed in the i th sector; =∧'' proportional change; 
and∆ is the determinant of the coefficient-matrix of (A.1). 
 
From (A.1) it can be proved that: 
(i) 0<∆  if 23 KK θθ > ; and, 11 KCLC SS ≥  
(ii) 0)ˆˆ( >−WWS  when 0ˆ >K  if 23 KK θθ >  
 
Differentiating (12) it may be checked that 
ˆ 0CL < when ˆ 0K > if 3 2.K Kθ θ>  
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